NOTE
HOT-CARGO AGREEMENTS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY:
RESTRAINTS ON
SUBCONTRACTING
UNDER THE PROVISO TO SECTION 8(e)
The National Labor Relations Act1 includes a general policy

against secondary union activity-union pressure exerted against a
neutral employer in order to influence the labor relations of another
employer.2 In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed strikes and boycotts

for secondary objectives, 3 but a loophole in the Act rendered agree-

ments aimed at secondary objectives immune from scrutiny under the

labor laws.4 These agreements are known as "hot-cargo" contracts, a
term that arose from their original use by the Teamsters Union.5
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
2. The key anti-secondary provisions, id. §§ 158(b)(4), 158(e), derive from the Labor-Management Relations (raft-Hartley) Act, id. §§ 141-197, as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, id. §§ 151-169. Secondary activity has been
defined as union action, such as threats, strikes, or boycotts, designed not to affect the labor policies of the employer at which the action is directed, but rather to influence the labor policies of
another employer. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644-45 (1967).
To prevent this activity, section 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(A) (1976), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike, boycott, threaten, or
coerce any person with the object of forcing that person to enter into a prohibited secondary
agreement; section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), makes it an unfair labor practice to
threaten or coerce a person with the object of forcing that person to cease doing business with
another person; and section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union and an employer to enter into an agreement to refuse to handle the goods of or to cease
doing business with any other person. See generally Nash, Connell "Hot Cargo"Agreements The
Supreme Court as Interpretedby the NLRB, 83 DICK. L. REv. 661, 662-66 (1979).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
4. The Supreme Court created this loophole with its decision in Local 1976, United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 107-11 (1958). Congress was aware of this decision's impact on Taft-Hartley. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1959),
reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DisCLOSURE AcT OF 1959, at 474-75 (1959) (minority views) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HIST.]; H.R.
REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959), reprintedin I LEGIS. HIST., supra, at 778-79. See
also National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 633-36 (1967).
5. The Teamsters Union inserted these provisions in its contracts with trucking firms. A
company that wanted to ship goods with a trucker whose employees were represented by the
Teamsters had to recognize the Teamsters to prevent his goods from becoming hot cargo-goods
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In response to widespread dissatisfaction with the labor laws' tolerance of secondary agreements, 6 Congress amended the Act in 1959
by adding section 8(e), 7 which curtails the freedom of unions and employers to make hot-cargo agreements. The amended Act does not absolutely prohibit all secondary igreements, however. A proviso to8
section 8(e) gives a limited exception for subcontracting agreements
between a union and an employer in the construction industry; a second proviso creates a more generous exception for the garment industhe Teamsters would not handle. See Fleming, Title VI" 7he Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw.
U.L. REV. 666, 686 (1960). The term "hot cargo" contract has come to embrace all secondary
agreements "by which the employer promises not to use the materias--or... the services-of
nonunion employers." Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1343 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionforrehearingen banc granted,No. 783469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).

6. See

SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT

FIELD (MCCLELLAN COMMITTEE), FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
Senator Dirksen introduced the remarks of Secretary of Labor Mitchell into the Congressional
Record to illustrate the hostility to these hot-cargo clauses: "The testimony before the select committee again and again illustrated the method by which certain unions, particularly the Teamsters,
utilized the inadequacies of the present secondary boycott provisions to force employers to do
business with only those people approved by union officials." 105 CONG. REC. 1730 (1959), reprintedin II LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 993.
7. Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases
or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or
otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void:
Provided,That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or
repair of a building, structure, or other work: Providedfurther,That for the purposes of
this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section the terms "any employer", "any
person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce", and "any person"
when used in relation to the terms "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer",
"any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in te relation of
ajobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of
manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in
the
the jobber
apparelorand clothing industry: Providedfurther, That nothing in this subchap ter
shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing excepton.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
(1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976)).

§

704, 73 Stat. 519

On the background of section 8(e), see generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
645-74 (1971); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLeA §§ 8(b)(4) and
8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000 (1965); St. Antoine, Secondary Boycotts andHot Cargo: A Study in
Balance ofPower, 40 U. DET. LJ. 189 (1962); Comment, SubcontractingClausesandSection 8(e)
ofthe NationalLaborRelationsAct, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1176 (1964); Comment, Hot Cargo Clauses:
The Scope of Section 8(e), 71 YALE L.J. 158 (1961).
8. This note refers to agreements between a union and an employer concerning the employees subcontracting practices as "subcontracting agreements."
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try. 9 The construction industry proviso allows a union to agree with an
employer in the construction industry to restrict subcontracting at the

job site to firms employing union workers.10 These agreements are secondary because they use the general contractor to pressure the sub-

contractors to recognize the union as the representative of the
subcontractor's employees.
The purposes and scope of the construction industry proviso have
long been disputed." The Supreme Court's decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 10012 intensified the debate over the

type of subcontracting agreement that the proviso was designed to protect. The Connell Court held that the construction industry proviso
does not protect a subcontracting agreement negotiated outside of a

collective bargaining context and not confined to the particular job site
where the union members are present.13 This decision put in question
the legality of commonly used construction industry subcontracting
agreements. According to the General Counsel of the National Labor
9. While the construction industry proviso permits unions and employers to enter into certain secondary agreements, and allows construction unions to exert coercive pressure to obtain
such agreements, see notes 67-73 infra and accompanying text, the garment industry proviso further allows unions to enforce such agreements by coercive pressure. See Danielson v. Joint Bd. of
Coat Workers, 494 F.2d 1230, 1237 (2d Cir. 1974).
10. Restrictions on subcontracting are valid, without regard to the construction industry proviso, if they are addressed to primary aims. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
612 (1967). Clauses that limit subcontracting to preserve traditional bargaining-unit work are
primary. They seek not to change the labor policies of another employer, but to maintain work
traditionally given to the union members by their own employer. Cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (the contracting out of work that bargaining-unit employees
traditionally perform is a mandatory subject of bargaining). Similarly, area-standards or unionstandards clauses, which require a subcontractor to pay wages at the prevailing union rate, are
lawful primary clauses; they are designed to discourage subcontracting and to prevent the erosion
of negotiated standards. See Comment, Picketingfor 4rea Standards: An Exception to Section
8(b)(7), 1968 DuKE L. 767. By contrast, union-signatory subcontracting clauses (particularunion clauses), which restrict subcontracting to firms that have a contract with the union that has
signed the subcontracting agreement, are secondary. They seek to widen the union's representation of workers by compelling subcontracting firms to recognize the union. These clauses advance
general union aims, rather than specific objectives of the bargaining unit. See Heavy, Highway,
Bldg. & Constr. Teamsters Comm. (Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass'n), 227 N.L.R.B. 269, 276
(1976) (Member Fanning, dissenting in part). A provision phrased as a union-standards clause
may be construed as a union-signatory clause if the terms with which the subcontractor must
comply match too closely those of the signatory union. See Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke &
Romero Framing, Inc.), 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), enforcedas modfedsub nom. Pacific Northwest
Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petition
for rehearingen banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
11. See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Northeastern
Ind. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apartments), 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964),
enforcement denied, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
12. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
13. Id. at 635.
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Relations Board (NLRB), Connell "significantly narrowed the scope of
interpretation previously given it by the
the proviso from the broader
4
Board and the Courts."'

Before Connell the NLRB had considered a subcontracting agreement lawful as long as it was negotiated in a collective bargaining context.15 After Connell the question was more complex. First, Connell
left open the possibility that in order to be sheltered by the proviso, a
subcontracting agreement must not only be negotiated in a collective
bargaining context, but must also be limited to particular sites where
union members were working.' 6 Second, Connell raised questions

about the lawfulness of a subcontracting agreement that required a
subcontractor to recognize not just any union but the particular union

that had made the subcontracting agreement.' 7 Finally, Connell did
not make clear whether a prehire agreement, the standard type of col-

lective bargaining agreement in the construction industry, would satisfy
the requirement that the union and employer have a collective bargain-

ing relationship.' 8
Two courts of appeals recently faced these issues. A panel of the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Pacfc Northwest Chapter of
14. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum on Connell, Guidelines for Handling Section
8(e) Construction Industry Proviso Cases Under the Supreme Court's Connell Decision at I
(1976), reprintedin LAB. REL.YEARBOOK 295 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum]. Several cases after Connell held that a collective bargaining agreement was
not sufficient to protect a secondary subcontracting clause under the construction industry proviso
unless the clause was limited to particular job sites where union employees were present. See
notes 150-58 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Plumbers Local 100 (Hagler Constr. Co.), NLRB Case No. 16-CC-447 (May 1, 1974).
The General Counsel's Memorandum supporting his decision not to issue a complaint against
Plumbers Local 100 is reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 298 (1974).
16. See 421 U.S. at 633. See also note 108 infra.
17. See 421 U.S. at 630-35. By stressing the fact that Congress did not wish to foster topdown organizing, the Court cast doubt on subcontracting agreements that specify a particular
union rather than allowing any union. See also Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859,
884-86 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1350 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979),petiionfor rehearingen banc granted, No. 783469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
18. For a definition of a prehire agreement, see notes 105-06 infra and accompanying text.
The Court suggested that a prehire agreement under section 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976) might
be adequate. Rejecting an argument that the NLRB had already decided the issue in Conneli
(whether a subcontracting agreement fell within the construction industry proviso even if the
union that negotiated it had no collective bargaining relationship with the employer), the Court
distinguished Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (B & J Investment Co.), 214 N.L.R.B.
562 (1974), by noting that it may have involved a prehire agreement. 421 U.S. at 631-32 n.10. The
Court's reference, however, did not purport to decide the issue. See Donald Schriver, Inc. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 859, 873 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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the Associated Builders and Contractors v. NLRB, 19 rejected the view
that a collective bargaining relationship alone privileges a subcontracting agreement under the construction industry proviso to section 8(e).
The court reasoned that the sole purpose of the proviso is to allow
agreements designed to alleviate the friction between union and nonunion employees working shoulder to shoulder on a job site. 20 A subcontracting agreement, even in a collective bargaining context, thus
may not lawfully restrict subcontracting to union firms except in the
common-situs situation.21 The court indicated that were an agreement
appropriately limited, however, it could specify a particular union that
subcontractors must recognize. 22 The court did not address the sufficiency of prehire agreements.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in DonaldSchriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 23 disagreed with the Ninth Circuit on the
scope of the construction industry proviso. Donald Schriver held that
two concerns lie behind the proviso: first, to enable unions to avert
common-situs tension; and second, to permit standardization of workhag conditions and protection of the employment opportunities of
union members.24 The second purpose justifies subcontracting agreements that apply to all job sites at which work is done by the signatory
union's craft. The court also upheld subcontracting restraints on other
crafts, because these restraints help avoid common-situs tension.25 Fimeets the collecnally, DonaldSchriver held that a prehire agreement
26
tive bargaining requirement set out in Connell.
The conflict between PacfcNorthwest and DonaldSchriver stems
from divergent views of the purposes behind the construction industry
proviso and of the proper interpretation of Connell. This note exammnes the scope of the proviso. First, the note sketches the background of
the proviso and its application by the courts. Second, the note analyzes
the ambiguities in the Connell Court's reasoning and the confusion that
Connell has engendered. Finally, the note turns to the recent decisions
by the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and District of Columbia Cir19. 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),peditonforhearingen banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir.
Aug. 19, 1980).
20. 609 F.2d at 1349-50.
21. The common-situs situation consists of the presence of many employers on a single job
site. For an example of a common-situs arrangement, see Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
22. 609 F.2d at 1350 n.8. The court believed that frictions on thejobsite might occur as easily

between members of different unions as between union and nonunion workers.
23. 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 880.
25. Id. at 883-84.
26. Id. at 872-73.
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cuits. The note argues that the Pacfc Northwest court failed to consider adequately the legislative history of section 8(e), the pattern of
bargaining in the construction industry, and the interaction of the applicable labor laws. The DonaldSchriver court displayed greater ap-

preciation of the special circumstances of the construction industry,
and therefore framed a more appropriate response to the post-Connell

issues. In conclusion, the note explores the tension between Donald
Schriver and Connell concerning the effect of subcontracting agreements on nonunion firms, and suggests that Connell be limited to accommodate the construction industry's realities that Donald Schriver
recognized.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PROVISO

A. Prelude to Section 8(e): Denver Building Trades and Sand

Door.
The NLRB did not assume jurisdiction over the construction in-

dustry until the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947.27 Hence, the pattern of collective bargaining between construction unions and
employers developed independently of doctrines that the Board im-

posed on other industries. When the Board applied the Act to construction unions after 1947, confficts emerged between the unique
features of the construction industry and the general provisions of the
Act.

28

27. Labor-Management Relations (raft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)). The NLRB declined to assert
jurisdiction over the construction industry under the original Wagner Act, ch. 372, §§ 1-19, 49
Stat. 449 (1935), without explaining its reasons. Johns-Manville Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 1 (1945). See
also In re Brown & Root, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 820 (1943). After Taft-Hartley, the Board responded
to the express intent of Congress, see S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947), by taking
jurisdiction over construction-industry cases. Plumbing Contractors Ass'n, 93 N.L.R.B. 1081
(1951). See also Fleming, supra note 5, at 702-03.
28. See Fleming, The Building Trades and Title VII of LMRDA, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT OF 1959 at 1032 (R. Slovenko ed.
1961). Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the construction industry had typically hired through hiring
halls run by the construction unions. Id. 1035-36. This practice enabled the unions to ensure that
all employees on the job were union members. Congress moved against such "closed shops" in
Taft-Hartley, and provided that union-security agreements-agreements requiring that an employee join a union--could not require an employee to join a union until he had been working for
30 days. Pub. L. No. 80-101 § 8(a), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976)).
In the construction industry, however, many jobs last less than 30 days. Fleming, supra, at 1036.
The Board was therefore constantly faced with union subterfuges to avoid Taft-Hartley, and its
efforts to enforce the Act were generally frustrated. Id. In 1956 the Board clamped down and
required a union to reimburse dues collected under an illegal closed-shop agreement. Plumbers
Local 231 (Brown-Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp.), 115 N.L.R.B. 594, 597 (1956) (a closed-shop
agreement that required the employer not to hire a person unless the union referred him was held
unlawful). The use of this remedy generated so much controversy that it was suspended until
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NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council2 9 highlighted one such problem. In Denver Building Trades a general con-

tractor awarded an electrical subcontract to a subcontractor who
employed nonunion labor. Other subcontractors on the site, as well as
the general contractor, were union firms. The union workers picketed
to protest the presence of nonunion workers on the site. Giving in to
the pressure, the general contractor terminated the employment of the

nonunion subcontractor. 30 The subcontractor then filed unfair labor

practice charges with the NLRB. The Board found that the unions had

used unlawful secondary pressure against a neutral employer--the general contractor-with the object of influencing the labor policies of the

nonunion subcontractor. The Board therefore ordered the unions to
cease and desist from the unlawful picketing. 3 1 The Supreme Court
constituted secondary
agreed with the Board, holding that the picketing
32

pressure in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
In construing the Taft-Hartley Act to prohibit common-situs picketing,33 the Denver Building Trades Court rejected the argument that all

employees on a construction site work for the general contractor. 34 The

Court noted that the general contractor brings the subcontractor onto
the site and supervises his work, but considered it well settled that the
two are independent contractors. 35 Pressure on the general contractor

to influence labor policies of the subcontractor thus breaches the antisecondary provisions of the Act.36 In dissent, Justice Douglas argued

1958. Fleming, supra, at 1036. In 1959 Congress attempted to adjust the labor laws to construction industry bargaining practices by enacting section 8(f), which legalized prehire agreements.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86257, § 705(a), 73 Stat. 543 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976)).
29. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
30. Id. at 677-79.
31. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 82 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1949).
32. 341 U.S. at 689.
33. Id. at 689-90. Common-situs picketing occurs when one union pickets at a multi-employer construction site, thus inducing members of all unions at the site to walk off the job. See
Comment, The Impact of the Taft-HartleyAct on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 YALE

L.J. 673 (1951).
34. 341 U.S. at 689-90.
35. Id.

36. During the Senate debate on the conference report accompanying the Landrum-Griffin
Act, Senator Morse criticized the Denver BuildingTrades decision for neglecting the close relationship between contractors and subcontractors on a construction site. 105 CONG. REc. 17,881 (1959)
(remarks of Sen. Morse), reprinted in II LEGIs. HIST., supra note 4, at 1425. Unlike the true

neutral employers that the secondary-boycott restrictions were designed to protect, the
general contractor is, in effect, entirely in control of the kind of labor relations taking
place on ajob site which he runs. He lets subcontracts based on price, responsibility, and
the ability to handle labor relations.
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that common-situs picketing does not constitute secondary activity.3 7
Common-situs picketing, he stated, reflects only the traditional union
demand that "union men not be compelled to work alongside nonunion men on the same job. '38 The unions picketed because the general
contractor brought nonunion workers on the job site; that a subcontractor was the means of accomplishing this was immaterial.
The failure of DenverBuilding Trades to accommodate the interest
of unionized construction workers in working on an all-union site did
not end union efforts to attain that goal. Denver BuildingTrades settled
that secondary pressure tactics violate Taft-Hartley. Yet voluntary
agreements between unions and employers to restrict subcontracting to
union firms appeared to be lawful under Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpentersv. NLRB (SandDoor).39
In SandDoor two general contractors entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners. The agreement provided that the carpenters need not work on
material produced by nonunion workers. 40 Despite the agreement, the
general contractors purchased doors from the Sand Door and Plywood
Company, a distributor of nonunion doors. When union representatives discovered this, they directed union members to stop working.
Sand Door filed charges alleging that the carpenters had exerted pressure against it to prevent it from doing business with the nonunion
manufacturer; the carpenters raised the hot-cargo contract as a defense.

41

The Court held that an employer's voluntary agreement not to
purchase doors made by a nonunion company could not be enforced by
coercive union tactics.42 The hot-cargo agreement itself, however, did
The Board and the Supreme Court, in the Denver Building Trades case, held that

this very unified relationship was a group of separate employers; hence, a primary dispute with one of them would have to be conducted in a way not to induce the employees
of the other contractors on the job to refrain from work. This case . . .involved an
electrical contractor paying 42 cents an hour below the negotiated area rate. That such a
subcontractor was on the job at all was directly due to a decision by the general contractor, and it is difficult to see how a union inducement of his employees to leave work can

be justly prohibited ....
Id.

37. 341 U.S. at 692 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
357 U.S. 93 (1958).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 94-96.

42. Id. at 104-05. The Court reasoned that the secondary boycott provisions prohibited only
coercive secondary pressure. Hence, a voluntary agreement by an employer did not violate the

Act. If an employer did not honor a voluntary agreement, however, the element of voluntariness
ceased. Union action at that point contravened the policy against involuntary cessations of doing
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not constitute illegal secondary activity. 43 Sand Door thus enabled un-

ions to enter into agreements with employers to influence the labor policies of other employers. 44 A union could attain through an agreement

exactly what Denver Building Trades declared it could not achieve
through pressure: it could prevent a general contractor from employing
nonunion subcontractors. This arrangement satisfied neither construc-

tion unions nor employers. The unions wanted to eliminate the ban on
common-situs picketing; 45 the employers sought an additional ban on

secondary subcontracting agreements. 46 Congress addressed these matters when it amended the Act by passing the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, popularly known as the LandrumGriffin Act. 47
B.

The Genesis of the ConstructionIndustry Proviso to Section 8(e).
The Landrum-Griffin Act combines two distinct types of provi-

sions.48 One group of sections regulates the internal affairs of unions to
promote union democracy. 49 A second set, amending the Taft-Hartley

Act,50 tightens Taft-Hartley's restrictions on organized labor's activities.51 Section 8(e)52 is of the second type. The aim of section 8(e),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization and an
employer to agree not to do business with a third person, is to outlaw
5
secondary agreements.

3

business with another person to influence that person's labor relations. The Court therefore measured freedom of choice at the time the protested union action occurred. Id.
43. Id. at 108.
44. Although Sand Door actually dealt with a product-boycott agreement, both the Court
and the Board have acknowledged that Sand Door applied generally to secondary agreements.
See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 516 (1977) ("[Tlhe making and voluntary observance of [hot cargo] contracts were not contrary to law at the time that SandDoor was
decided"); Metropolitan Dist. Council, 149 N.L.R.B. 646, 658 (1964) (discussing "the then-lawful
'hot-cargo' clause in the Sand Door case").
45. See Note, TheAntitrust Exemptionfor Labor Organizationsin the ConstructionIndustry, 2
WHrrrIER L. REv. 285, 289-90 (1980).
46. See Fleming, supra note 5, at 682.
47. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. II
1978)).
48. See generally Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and DisclosureAct of 1959 (pts.
1-2), 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 1086 (1960).
49. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, tits. I-IV, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959) (current version codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
50. Id., tit. VII (current version codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
51. See C. MoRRIs, supra note 7, at 51-54; Cox, The Landrum-Grifi Amendments to the
NationalLabor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 260 (1959).
52. The text of section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), is set out in note 7 supra.
53. The Supreme Court had implied that secondary agreements were lawful in Local 1976,
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958). See notes 39-44 supra and
accompanying text.
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Congress prohibited secondary agreements principally because
they enmesh a neutral employer in a labor struggle between a union
and the primary employer. 54 But the neutral (secondary) employer is
not the only person the secondary agreement influences; the agreement
also affects the employees of the primary employer. By threatening the
primary employer with the loss of business if it does not recognize the
union, secondary agreements tend to organize from the top down.55
Rather than appealing directly to the workers to form a union, topdown organizing imposes the union on both the workers and their employer, depriving the workers of their right to choose or refrain from
choosing a bargaining representative. 56 As a practical matter, once the
employer recognizes the union, all the employees may be forced to submit to that union's representation. 57 Section 8(e) was part of Congress's
scheme to limit top-down organizing. 58 The scheme not only restricted
hot-cargo contracts, but also regulated primary recognitional picket60
ing59 and proscribed secondary economic pressure.
The Senate originally proposed that section 8(e) cover only the
transportation industry, in response to the Teamsters Union's notorious
54. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612,635-38 (1967). The National
Woodwork Manufacturers Court stated that both section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(1976), and section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (e) (1976), were designed to insulate neutral secondary
employers from pressure to boycott a primary employer. 386 U.S. at 635.
55. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
56. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), secures this right.
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized m section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
57. The Act authorizes union-security agreements that require an employee in a union shop
to join the union within thirty days of his employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). In the
construction industry, section 8(f) permits this period to be shortened to seven days. 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(f) (1976). State right-to-work laws, however, may prohibit union-security agreements. 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
58. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). A union may picket an employer with the object of

compelling that employer to recognize the union. Although this picketing is primary, it still may
constitute top-down organizing because the employer may recognize the union, without regard for

the employees' wishes, in order to end the picketing. Cf. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354
U.S. 284 (1957) (the Court upheld a state court injunction against a union's picketing for recognition, when the picketing was designed to influence the employer to pressure his employees to join
the union).
60. See 29 U.S.C.

§§

158(b)(4)(B), 159(c) (1976).
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use of hot-cargo agreements. 6' The Teamsters had used their control
over the trucking industry to win agreements entitling them to refuse to
handle goods of nonunion manufacturers. Because these manufacturers depended on the trucking industry to transport their products, the
Teamsters could exert pressure on them to recognize Teamsters locals. 62 The House, however, saw a broader evil in secondary agreements, and countered with a sweeping condemnation of secondary
agreements in all industries. 63 In conference the House version of section 8(e) prevailed, but the Senate insisted on an exception for the construction industry and an even broader exception for the garment
industry.64 The construction industry proviso states:
Provided,That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a
building, structure, or other work .... 65
Few legislators spoke on the construction industry proviso, and the remarks of those who did were brief. The NLRB and the courts have
thus looked to the general structure of the labor laws as well as to the
legislative history for guidance in interpreting the proviso.
C.

Pre-ConnellInterpretationsof the Proviso.

Three developments in the interpretation of section 8(e) preceded
the Supreme Court's Connell decision. The courts at first uniformly
rejected the NLRB's narrow construction of the proviso and eventually
persuaded the Board to adopt a broader view of it. Courts then began
to limit the contours of the proviso, finding that the Board's interpretation went beyond the purposes Congress had for the proviso. Finally,
the Supreme Court decided a major section 8(e) case, in the course of
61. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(a) (1959), reprintedin I LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 4, at
582. As originally proposed, the subsection read:

(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
who is a common carrier subject to Part I1of the Interstate Commerce Act to enter into
any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains
or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, or transporting any of the products of
any other employer or to cease doing business with the same.
Id. On the original motivation of the Senate to reach only the Teamsters with its prohibition of
hot-cargo clauses, see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 636 (1967); S. REP.
No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprintedin I LEis. HIST., supra note 4, at 475.
62. See S. REp. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprintedin I LEros. HIsT., supra note 4, at
474, 475.
63. See H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. § 705(b)(1) (1959), reprintedin I LEGis. HIST., supra
note 4, at 683.
64. See CONF. COMM. REP., H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 39-40 (1959), reprinted
in I LEois. HIsT., supra note 4, at 934, 943-44.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
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which the Court touched on the purposes of the construction industry
66
proviso.
The first development concerned the Board's initial reluctance to
permit unions to pressure employers to accept subcontracting agree67
ments that the construction industry proviso concededly protected.
Section 8(b)(4)(A) 68 makes it an unfair labor practice to compel an employer to enter into an agreement prohibited by section 8(e). The
Board found that section 8(b)(4)(A) and 8(e) combined to prohibit
union pressure for subcontracting agreements. 69 This analysis rested
on the view that Congress intended to permit only voluntary subcontracting agreements. 70 Three courts of appeals rejected this view, holding that section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibited pressure to obtain secondary
agreements proscribed by section 8(e) but did not reach lawful secondary agreements such as those shielded by the construction industry
proviso. 71 In 1964 the Board acceded to this view. In NortheasternIndianaBuildingand ConstructionTrades Council (Centlivre Village Apartments) ,72 the Board recognized that the congressional scheme
governing construction industry subcontracting allowed unions to use
economic pressure to secure agreements protected by the proviso.
73
After Centlivre the Board began to construe the proviso expansively.
The second step in defining the scope of the proviso was taken
when courts were asked to determine the meaning of "job site" work.
By its terms the construction industry proviso protects only those agreements between unions and employers that relate to work on a construction site. 74 In Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB 75 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held unlawful an agreement between a
66. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
67. See Construction, Prod., & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 (Colson & Stevens Constr.
Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650 (1962), enforcement denied, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).

68. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976).
69. See Construction, Prod., & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 (Colson & Stevens Constr.
Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650 (1962), enforcement denied, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
70. Id.
71. See Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Construction, Prod., & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
72. 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), enforcement deniedon other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
73. See Plumbers Local 100 (Hagler Constr. Co.), NLRB Case No. 16-CC-447 (May 1, 1974).

The General Counsel's memorandum supporting his decision not to issue a complaint against
Plumbers Local 100 is reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 298 (1974).

74. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The text of the proviso is set out at text accompanying
note 65 supra. "The proviso does not exempt from section 8(e) agreements relating to supplies or
other products or materials shipped or otherwise transported and delivered on the site of construction." CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 64, at 39, reprintedin I LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 943.
75. 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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union and an employer that permitted the employees to honor a secondary picket line.76 Because this amounted to an authorization of a secondary strike, it fell within section 8(e). The union, which represented
truck drivers transporting ready-mix concrete, argued that the construction industry proviso sheltered the agreement. This contention required the court to determine whether Congress intended the job-site
limitation in the proviso to cover suppliers of concrete. To answer this
question the court examined the proviso's purposes. 77 The court concluded that "the purpose of the section 8(e) proviso was to alleviate the
frictions that may arise when union men work continuously alongside
nonunion men on the same construction site."' 78 Because drivers delivering concrete worked only briefly on the construction site, the friction
feared by Congress would not develop. Hence, the proviso did not legitimate the agreement. The significance of DriversLocal 695 is that it
saw a single purpose for the proviso: the avoidance of job-site friction. 79
The final pre-Connell development was the Supreme Court's decision in National Woodwork ManufacturersAssociation v. NLRB.8° In
National Woodwork Manufacturers,a general contractor had an agreement with the Carpenters International Union that union carpenters
did not have to handle prefitted doors. Although the contractor's job
specifications did not require prefitted doors, it obtained them anyway.
Upon the carpenters' refusal to hang the doors, the contractor acquired
doors to be fitted on the job site. The National Woodwork Manufacturer's Association then filed unfair labor practice charges against the
union with the NLRB, alleging that the refusal-to-handle clause vio76. The court construed the agreement as sanctioning a secondary boycott against the primary employer. Id. at 549. This situation would arise when a union that has a dispute with a
subcontractor pickets a general contractor to induce him not to do business with the subcontractor.
If the general contractor does not discipline his employees when they refuse to cross the picket
line, he has in effect authorized a secondary boycott.
77. Id. at 552.
78. Id. at 553.
79. The DriversLocal 695 court's analysis of the proviso did not depend on a reading of the
legislative history; rather, the court relied on Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332
F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964); Justice Douglas's dissent in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951); and two law review comments: Comment, TheLandrum-GrIffn
Amendment: Labor's Use ofthe Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724 (1960); Comment, Hot
CargoAgreements Under the NationalLaborRelationsAct: Analysis of Section 8(e), 38 N.Y.U. L.
Rv.97 (1963). Alternative reasons for the proviso, such as a desire to preserve a pattern of
collective bargaining, were not discussed despite statements indicating such a policy by Senator
John Kennedy, the proponent of the proviso. See 105 CONG. Rc. 17,899 (1959) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy), reprintedin II LEGIs. HisT., supra note 4, at 1432. See also Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1975) (dismissing such remarks as "bare references").
80. 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Justice Stewart, joined
by three other justices, dissented. See 386 U.S. at 650 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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lated section 8(e). 8 ' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accepted this contention82 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
section 8(e) proscribed only secondary agreements.8 3 Agreements that

restricted subcontracting solely to protect the jobs of union members
were primary agreements, because they aimed to preserve the work of
the bargaining unit. The Court thus upheld the union's refusal-to-han84
dle clause.

Although National Woodwork Manufacturers did not involve the
construction industry proviso, the Court drew upon it to support the
conclusion that section 8(e) prohibited only secondary agreements.85
The Court construed the proviso as "a measure designed to allow

agreements pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construction site because of the close community of interests there .... "86
The Court illuminated the meaning of "close community of interests"

by citing a case that interpreted the proviso as a grant to construction
unions "in recognition of. .. sporadic work stoppages occasioned by
the traditional refusal of craft unionists to work alongside non-union
men on the same project." 87 The Court also cited a law review com-

ment that spelled out the need for all crafts on a job to act collectively
in order to compel the general contractor not to subcontract to non88
union firms.

81. Id. at 615-16.
82. 354 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1965), rei'd,386 U.S. 612 (1967).
83. The Court stated that secondary agreements can be identified by considering:
whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union's objective was preservation of work for [the contracting employer's] employees, or whether the agreements...
were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. . . . The touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the relations of the contracting

employer vis-i4-vis his own employees.
386 U.S. at 644-45 (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 646; Gf. NLRB v. Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) (the union violated the
secondary boycott prohibitions of section 8(b)(4) by picketing a subcontractor in order to enforce
a valid primary work-preservation agreement, when the general contractor and not the subcontractor had the sole right to control the assignment of the work that the union sought).
85. 386 U.S. at 639. The construction industry proviso's job-site limitation indicated to the
Court that section 8(e) prohibits only secondary agreements. The Court reasoned that the legislative history does not suggest that Congress intended to allow construction unions to protect their
work against job-site prefabrication but not against off-job-site prefabrication. These difficulties
disappear if the body of section 8(e) is read to prohibit only secondary agreements, and the proviso is read to permit secondary agreements in relation to the job site, where construction unions
have a special interest in restricting employment to union members. Id. at 637-39.
86. Id. at 638-39.
87. Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 640 (3d Cir. 1964) (a
strike to obtain an agreement lawful under section 8(e) does not violate section 8(b)(4)(A)), citedin
386 U.S. at 639 n.32.
88. See Comment, supra note 33, at 684-89, citedin 386 U.S. at 639 n.32.
With employers numerous, employment of short duration, and individual craft unity
small on any one project, unions have traditionally been forced to rely on the coopera-
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The net effect of these developments was that the Board adopted a
broad reading of the construction industry proviso, which the courts

began to narrow to accord with the perceived congressional intent of
preserving job-site harmony. These two views clashed in Connell Construction Co. v. PlumbersLocal 100.89
II.
A.

CONNELL CONSTRUCTION Co. V. PLUMBERS LOCAL 100

The Facts andHolding of Connell.

The Connell case arose out of a campaign mounted by the Plumbers and Steamfitters Union to be recognized as the representative of

employees of the mechanical subcontractors in the Dallas area. Rather
than approach the employees directly, the Plumbers adopted a rela-

tively novel tactic designed to organize from the top down. 90 They
sought an agreement with the general contractors in the Dallas area,
including Connell, that the general contractors would subcontract work

within the trade jurisdiction of the Plumbers only to subcontractors
that recognized Plumbers Local 100. The Plumbers did not intend to

represent the general contractors' own employees. In fact, the Plumbers presented the proposed agreement only to general contractors who

did not employ workers within the Plumbers' trade jurisdiction. In order to induce Connell to sign the agreement, a single representative of
the Plumbers picketed a Connell job site. After 150 workers walked off
the job, Connell gave in and signed the agreement. He then sued to
void the agreement on antitrust grounds. The union raised the defense
91
that the construction industry proviso authorized the agreement.

tion of all workers on a job in order to bring pressure on any particular employer. Thus
where one subcontractor refuses to hire union men, the spumed union pickets the entire
project to induce the union employees of other subcontractors on the job to walk out.
This in turn is designed to compel the general contractor to sever relations with the nonunion subcontractor.
Comment, supra note 33, at 688.
89. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
90. The tactic the Plumbers used in Connell was not their first attempt to organize the
mechanical subcontractors. An earlier case, Dallas Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 396
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968), dealt with the Trade Council's picketing of general contractors in Dallas to obtain subcontracting agreements. Because the general contractors had a collective bargaining agreement with some of the constituent crafts of the Trades Council, the court held that the
picketing was recognitional, and that it therefore violated section 8(b)(7) because it interfered with
the representation of the general contractors' employees by another union. The court hinted, however, that a union could avoid the section 8(b)(7) issue by picketing a general contractor who did
not employ members of the picketing union's craft. 396 F.2d at 682 n.8. This suggestion resulted
in the picketing held unlawful in Connell. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of
Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603, 625-26 (1976). Professor St. Antoine described this as a "relatively novel organizational tactic." Id. 628.
91. 421 U.S. at 618-21. Connell originally filed suit in state court, alleging that the agreement
violated Texas antitrust law. The Plumbers removed the action to federal court; Connell then
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The Supreme Court held that the agreement fell outside of the

proviso, and that the Plumbers therefore could not use the proviso as a

93
defense against an antitrust suit. 92 Justice Powell, for the majority,

construed the construction industry proviso as extending "only to
agreements in the context of collective bargaining relationships and, in

light of congressional references to the Denver Building Trades problem, possibly to common-situs relationships on particular job sites as
well." 94 Because the Plumbers did not have a collective bargaining relationship with Connell and because the subcontracting agreement was
not limited to particular job sites, the Court held that the proviso did

95
not apply to the agreement.
The Court first looked to legislators' statements about the purpose

of the proviso in order to determine its scope. The Connell Court

found the sparse legislative explanations for the proviso unenlightening. The legislative history states that the proviso was intended "to preserve the pattern of collective bargaining in the industry," but the
gave in and signed the agreement under protest. Id. at 620. In federal court Connell amended its
complaint to allege a Sherman Act violation. The union defended on grounds of statutory and
nonstatutory exemptions from the antitrust laws, and also claimed that the agreement was privileged by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). The district court, siding with the
union, held the agreement to be within the bounds of the proviso and, therefore, beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws. Id. at 621.
In affirming the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th
Cir. 1973), aj'dinpart and rev'din part, 421 U.S. 618 (1975), took another path. The agreement
aimed at a legitimate labor interest: eliminating competition over wages. As a result, the subcontracting restraint enjoyed a nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws. See 483 F.2d at
1167-69. The court declined to decide whether the proviso extended to subcontracting agreements
made outside of a collective bargaining context, believing that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over labor law questions. Id. at 1167-71, 1175.
92. For a discussion of the antitrust implications of Connell, see St. Antoine, supra note 90.
See also Casey & Cozzillio, Labor-Antitrust: TheProblemsofConnell andaRemedy That Follows
Naturally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235.
93. Four justices dissented, arguing that if the Plumbers' agreement fell outside the protection of the proviso, the labor laws provided an exclusive remedy. The dissenters did not reach the
section 8(e) proviso issue. See 421 U.S. at 638 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. (Stewart, J., joined by
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 633 (majority opinion). The Denver Building Trades problem refers to union picketing at a multi-employer construction site to remove a nonunion subcontractor. See notes 29-38
supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, Hot CargoAgreements in the ConstructionIndustry: The Effect of Acco Equipment, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1292, 1298-99 (1974).
95. 421 U.S. at 633. The Court also held that the Plumbers could not avail themselves of
either statutory or nonstatutory exemptions from the antitrust laws. Because neither the labor
laws nor the labor exemptions from the antitrust laws provided a defense, the Court held that the
Plumbers were not immune from suit under the Sherman Act. Id. at 635. Connell filed an antitrust suit, rather than charges with the NLRB, because the Board at that time considered subcontracting agreements like the one the Plumbers presented to be valid under section 8(e). See note
15 supra and accompanying text.
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Connell Court dismissed these remarks as "bare references. ' 96 Even if
construction unions had formerly employed top-down organizing, the

Court found it unlikely that Congress intended to foster such activity in
light of the Landrum-Griffin Act's aim of limiting top-down organiz-

ing.97

Instead, the Court viewed the construction industry proviso as "a

partial substitute for an attempt to overrule" the Denver Building
Trades decision. 98 The Conference Committee had added the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) but had failed to add a provi-

sion that would overrule Denver Building Trades and thereby permit
common-situs picketing. 99 The Connell Court considered the common-

situs picketing issue and the subcontracting agreement issue to be interrelated; it therefore read congressional discussion of the common-situs

problem as relevant to the secondary agreement issue. °0 In the Court's
view, both subcontracting agreements and common-situs picketing aim
at avoiding the simultaneous presence of union and nonunion workers

on the same job site. The construction industry proviso was designed
to meet this aim, not to permit top-down organizing.
The Court buttressed this analysis by examining the interplay of
the two provisos to section 8(e). The construction industry proviso does

not permit construction unions to enforce subcontracting agreements
by strikes and picketing. 0 1 This limitation contrasts with the broad

freedom to organize given to garment industry unions, which can en-

force their subcontracting agreements through economic action.10 2 The
96. 421 U.S. at 628.
97. Id. at 632.
98. Id. at 629. See note 94 supra. DenverBuilding Trades had held that union picketing at a
construction site for the purpose of removing a nonunion subcontractor was unlawful. See notes
29-38 supra and accompanying text.
99. See 105 CoNG. REc. 16,263, 16,416-18 (1951), reprintedin II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4,
at 1396-97, 1434-36. Senator John Kennedy attempted to add such a provision but House members indicated that they would protest this action because it was a new matter that had not previously been considered by either house of Congress. Id.
100. 421 U.S. at 629. The Court noted that
[d]iscussion of "special problems" in the construction industry, applicable to both the
section 8(e) proviso and the attempt to override DenverBuilding Trades, focused on the
problems of picketing a single nonunion subcontractor on a multiemployer building project, and the close relationship between contractors and subcontractors at the job site.
Id. at 629-30.
101. The construction industry proviso does not exempt construction unions from section
8(b)(4)(B), which prohibits secondary strikes and boycotts. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). Moreover,
Congress specifically stated that secondary subcontracting agreements in the construction industry
were not enforceable through economic action. See CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 64, at 39,
reprintedin I LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 943; 105 CONG. REc. 16,415 (1959), reprintedin II
LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1433.
102. The garment industry proviso, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), permits garment unions both to
make and to enforce secondary agreements. See II LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1377, 1385, 1576,
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comparison between the construction and garment industry provisos

suggested to the Court that Congress did not intend the construction
industry proviso to shelter agreements designed to organize from the
top down. 103

Finally, the Court noted that the 1959 amendments reinforced the
policy against top-down organizing by establishing "careful limits on
the economic pressure unions may use in aid of the organizational
campaigns." 1 4 The Court found it inconsistent with this general
scheme to suggest that Congress intended to give construction unions
an unrestricted right to engage in secondary organizational activity.

Congress did give special consideration to the construction industry in
section 8(f), which authorizes prehire agreements.10 5 Section 8(f) permits an employer to recognize a union before the union has attained
majority status, even before the employees have been hired. These
1708, for discussion of the reasons behind the garment industry exemption. The garment industry
was characterized by jobbers who contracted garment work out to small shops. These shops were
"fiercely competitive, constantly changing and difficult to organize." Id. 1385 (remarks of Sen.
Javits). Sweatshop conditions thus prevailed. Because secondary subcontracting agreements had
relieved these conditions, Congress wanted to preserve their lawfulness. See also Danielson v.
Joint Bd. of Coat Workers, 494 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1974) (a garment union may lawfully impose an
agreement on ajobber not to contract out to nonunion shops, even if the union and the jobber had
no collective bargaining agreement).
103. 421 U.S. at 632.
104. Id. at 633. The limits on organizational pressure sought to shield both employer and
employee from an undesired union. See id. at 632 n. 11. Congress limited secondary pressure by
enacting section 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976), "which restricts primary recognitional picketing," and by tightening section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), "which prohibits the
use of most secondary tactics in organizational campaigns." 421 U.S. at 632.
105. 421 U.S. at 633. Section 8(f) provides:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section
for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an
agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which
building and construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair labor practice)
because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established under
the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such agreement, or (2)
such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of such employment or the effective
date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to
notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or
gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such emspecifies minimum training or experience qualifications
ployment, or (4) such agreement
for employment or provides for priority in ojpportuniies for employment based upon
length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular geographical
That nothing in this subsection shall set aside the final proviso to subsecarea: Provided,
tion (a)(3) of this section: P"rovidedfurher, That any agreement which would be invalid,
but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to
section 159(c) or 159(e) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976). The Supreme Court has held that a union may not enforce an 8(f)
bargaining relationship until the union achieves majority support in the bargaining unit. NLRB
v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
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agreements, however, may be challenged in a representation election10 6
to preserve the employees' right to choose or decline representation.
Hence, section 8(f) affords only limited organizing leverage to construction unions.
The Connell Court therefore concluded that to uphold a subcontracting agreement that was obtained outside of a collective bargaining
context and was not narrowly directed to the common-situs problem
laws and
would undermine the anti-secondary provisions of the labor
10 7
freely.
representative
a
choose
to
the right of employees
B.

Connell Reexamined.
1. The Tension Between Connells A4na~ysis and the Language of

its Holding. The language of Connell's holding conflicts with the
Court's view of the proviso's purpose. Connell indicated that either of
two conditions might have brought the Plumbers' subcontracting agreement within the ambit of the proviso: a collective bargaining context or
a restriction to particular job sites.' 08 Yet earlier in the opinion the
Court analyzed the proviso as a measure to authorize secondary agreements pertaining to the construction site because of the "close community of interests" there, or for the "even narrower function" of avoiding
job-site friction. 0 9 The Court also linked the proviso to efforts to re106. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
107. 421 U.S. at 631-33.
108. The Court stated these two conditions both in defining the scope of the construction
industry proviso, 421 U.S. at 633, and in announcing the holding of the case, id. at 635. Professor
St. Antoine has suggested that these conditions constitute two logically alternative tests for the
validity of a subcontracting clause; however, "the Connell opinion is not clear on these points."
St. Antoine, supra note 90, at 619 n.74. Peter Nash, the Board's General Counsel when Connell
was decided, recently expressed the view that both conditions must be met in order for an agreement to satisfy the construction industry proviso. See Nash, supra note 2, at 674. For the same
opinion, see Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB,
609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),peitionforrehearingen banc granted,No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19,
1980).
A close reading of Connell, however, refutes Nash's view. The language of the holding implies alternative conditions. See text accompanying note 94 supra. Furthermore, if the proviso
aims only at avoiding job-site friction, as Nash argues, the dual restriction runs counter to Congress's intent. For instance, the employees of a union subcontractor on a job site have the same
interest in seeing that the general contractor does not subcontract to nonunion firms as do the
general contractor's own employees. Under Nash's view, however, unions representing the subcontractor's employees could not sign a subcontracting agreement with the general contractor because the subcontractors employees have no collective bargaining relationship with the general
contractor. Here, the bargaining relationship requirement serves no purpose but to frustrate unions in their effort to secure an all-union job site.
109. 421 U.S. at 630-31. The court quoted National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612, 638-39 (1967), for the "close community of interests" language. The "even narrower
function" had been expressed in Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Although the Court described the policy of avoiding job-site friction as narrower than the policy
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verse Denver Building Trades, thus implying that the proviso extended
only to common-situs agreements." 0 If the proviso's purpose is to protect agreements that prevent common-situs friction, a valid subcontracting agreement must be restricted to particular sites where union
members are working; the presence or absence of a collective bargaining agreement should be irrelevant. The Court failed, however, to address this problem.
2. The Purposeof the ConstructionIndustry Proviso. If Connell's
interpretation of the proviso as a measure to relieve job-site conffict is
correct, the language of the holding sweeps too broadly. But the
Court's interpretation is open to question. First, the cases that Connell
relied on to explain the proviso had addressed different issues than the
one facing the Connell Court.'' Second, the legislative history of the
proviso establishes that Congress sought to preserve a pattern of bargaining as well as to reduce job-site friction.' 12 Finally, the meaning of
job-site friction, which Connell did not explore, has less to do with actual conflict between union and nonunion workers at the job site than
to prevent the erosion of union standards and
with the desire of unions
13
the loss of union jobs. 1
(a) The cases cited by the Connell Court. In presenting its view
of the proviso's purpose, the Court relied on earlier cases that interpreted the construction industry proviso. The Court quoted the view
expressed in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v.
NLRB 1 4 that the proviso recognized the "close community of interests" on a construction site.115 The Connell Court also noted that
"[o]ther courts have suggested that [the proviso] serves an even narrower function.

.

. 'to alleviate the frictions that may arise when union

men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same construction site.'116 This language is drawn from Drivers Local 695 v.
NLRB." I1 In contrast to Connell, neither Drivers Local 695 nor National Woodwork Manufacturers involved subcontracting restrictions.
of protecting the close community of interests at the job site, it did not explain the difference
between the two policies. The authorities that National Woodwork Manufacturers relied on indicate that the two policies are the same. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 114-18 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 119-25 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 132-39 Jnfra and accompanying text.
114. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
115. 421 U.S. at 630 (quoting 386 U.S. at 639).
116. Id. (quoting Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
117. 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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National Woodwork Manufacturers dealt with work-preservation
agreements, and DriversLocal 695 with the meaning of work on a job

site. 1 8 Also unlike Connell, in both cases the union and the employer
did have a collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the earlier deci-

sions did not interpret the purpose of the proviso with respect to subcontracting clauses outside a collective bargaining context.

(b) The legislative history of theproviso andthe uniquefeatures of
the constructionindustry. The Connell Court's reading of the legislative

history overemphasized the common-situs problem as a factor in the
enactment of the proviso and underemphasized Congress's desire to

preserve construction industry bargaining patterns. Connell cites several passages of the legislative history that discuss the common-situs

problem in connection with proposals to exempt the construction industry from section 8(e). 119 The Court interpreted the passages to
mean that a common impulse lay behind the construction industry proviso and the proposal to overrule Denver Building Trades. 20 It therefore termed the proviso "a partial substitute for the attempt to
2
overrule" that case.' '

Two distinct concerns, however, lay behind the special consideration Congress gave to the construction industry in partially exempting
it from section 8(e). On the one hand, the prohibition against common118. National Woodwork Manufacturers concerned primary activity unrelated to organizational aims. 386 U.S. at 615. See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text. DriversLocal 695
focused on the distinction between ready-mix concrete deliverers and on-site workers. 361 F.2d at
552-53. Cf. Acco Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1975) (repairmen are
not equivalent to on-site workers).
An additional weakness of these authorities is their failure to consult the legislative history of
the construction industry proviso for guidance. Both National Woodwork Manufacturersand Drivers Local 695 rely solely on Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d
Cir. 1964), to support their interpretation of the proviso. Essex County, however, concerned economic pressure to obtain a concededly valid proviso agreement. In addition, the Essex County
opinion cites no support from the Board, the courts, or the legislative history for its view of the
proviso. Hence, although apparently basing its analysis of the proviso's purpose on solid precedent, the Connell Court in fact relied on the unsupported dicta of prior cases. Moreover, a case
that found a different purpose for the section 8(e) proviso--the preservation of "the stats quo of
bargaining in the construction industry"-received no mention at all. See Dallas Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
119. 421 U.S. at 630 n.9.
120. Id. at 629 n.8. The Court stated: "The Conference Committee proposed to include a
[Denver Buildig Trades] amendment to § 8(b)(4)(B) in the Conference agreement, along with a
closely linked construction industry exemption from § 8(e).. . . But a parliamentary obstacle
killed the § 8(b)(4)(B) amendment, and only the section 8(e) proviso survived." 421 U.S. at 629
n.8. See note 99 supra.
121. 421 U.S. at 629.
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situs picketing inspired legislation to permit such picketing. 122 On the
other hand, concern for the independent bargaining patterns in the
construction industry elicited proposals to preserve these established
patterns. Section 8(f), 123 permitting prehire agreements, was enacted at
the same time as the proviso and shows the legislative recognition of
the unique patterns of bargaining in the industry. The legislative history thus indicates that the DenverBuilding Trades problem was not the
sole impetus behind section 8(e). The unique bargaining patterns in
the construction industry were also on the legislators' minds.
Members of both houses of Congress repeatedly asserted that the
proviso to section 8(e) was intended to preserve the current scheme of
union-employer relations in the construction industry. Senator John
Kennedy's Conference Report to the Senate stated that the proviso "is
intended to preserve the present state of the law. . . .Agreements by
which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to be
legal today. They will not be unlawful under section 8(e)."' 24 The
House Conference Report agreed. 125 Connell thus neglected to recognize that an important purpose of the proviso was to adjust the labor
laws to the special needs of construction unions, including their established bargaining patterns.
The construction industry has several unique features126 that underlie section 8(f) and the proviso to section 8(e). First, construction
work lasts only a limited time at a single site. 127 Employees are therefore constantly changing employers and moving to new job sites. To
represent those workers effectively, unions must be able to bargain with
employers on their behalf even before the workers are hired for a specific job. 128 Second, to make an accurate bid, the employer needs to
know his labor costs before a job begins. Moreover, he must have
quick access to a pool of workers once the job starts.129 Third, subcon122. The various bills that included proposals to overrule the ban on common-situs picketing
are listed in II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 1912-15.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976).
124. 105 CONG. Rac. 17,900 (1959), reprintedin II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 1433.
125. See CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 44, at 39 (1959), reprintedin I LEolS. HIST., supra
note 4, at 943.
126. See S.RaP. No. 187, 86th Cong., IstSess. 27 (1959), reprinted in I LEGIs. HIST., supra

note 4, at 423.
127. Id

See also Fleming, supra note 28, at 1033.

128. This is the type of agreement permitted by section 8(f) of the Landrum-Grifin Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
129. For these reasons, prehire agreements were prevalent in the construction industry even
after the Taft-Hartley Act brought construction workers under the Board's jurisdiction. For evidence of congressional awareness of these features, see S. REt. No. 187, supra note 126, at 28,
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tracting is the norm rather than the exception in the industry. The gen-

eral contractor typically employs many subcontracting firms on the job
site.1

30

The labor laws, designed to promote fair labor practices in manu-

facturing, did not originally take into account these unique features of
construction labor.' 3 ' The requirement that a union obtain majority
support after the employees have been hired, though appropriate in the

manufacturing context, did not fit the construction industry. Similarly,
though the condemnation of hot-cargo contracts shielded neutral em-

ployers in most lines of work, in the construction industry it denied to
unions a tool to ensure that union members would be employed on the

construction site even if the general contractor subcontracted the work
sought by the union. Congress passed section 8(f) and the proviso to
section 8(e) to make the necessary adjustments.
(c)

The meaning of "job-sitefriction." Connell suggested that a

recognition of union solidarity at the job site or the narrower intention
to permit the avoidance of job-site friction caused Congress to adopt

the construction industry proviso.' 32 The Court did not shed much
light on the source of either the solidarity or the friction. DriversLocal

695 v. NLRB, t 33 cited by the Court,

34

seems to view the friction as

stemming from hostility between union and nonunion workers. 35 The
legislative history, however, implies that Congress was concerned that

nonunion firms on a project would impair the benefits for workers that
unions had won. Read in light of the legislative history, both the "close

community of interests" language and the reference to avoiding job-site
friction point to a single phenomenon: the solidarity of union members

in refusing to work with nonunion workers because to tolerate nonunion firms on the job site would undermine the union's strength.
reprinted in I LEGis. HIsT., supra note 4, at 424. Section 8(e) proviso agreements were also used in
the construction industry to further the aim of establishing union conditions on job sites. Congress, in passing the proviso, recognized that the proviso was "necessary to avoid serious damage
105 CONG. Rc. 17,899 (1959), reprintedin II LEGIS.
to the pattern of collective bargaining.
HIST., supra note 4, at 1432.
130. See Comment, supra note 94, at 1297.
131. See note 28 supra.
132. 421 U.S. at 630-31.
133. 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
134. See 421 U.S. at 630.
135. The Drivers Local 695 court stressed that the friction occurs between union and nonunion
workers who come into contact "continuously" on a construction site. 361 F.2d at 553. The facts
of NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), however, suggest that
union workers may not know or be concerned about the presence of nonunion workers on the site
until the union officials make them aware. See id. at 679 (the Trades Council picketed the site of
construction "to notify their members that nonunion men were working on it").
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Twice during the Senate debate on the proposed amendments to
Taft-Hartley, Senators recited the facts of Denver Building Trades136 to
argue that Congress should legislatively overrule the case. Senator
Morse emphasized that the union workers in Denver Building Trades
refused to tolerate a nonunion subcontractor on the site because the
nonunion subcontractor paid forty-two cents an hour less than was
paid to union workers. 137 Senator Carroll repeated this fact, adding
that "[t]he building trades workers-carpenters, bricklayers, and the
rest-said 'we refuse to work alongside them.' "138
These interpretations of Denver Building Trades emphasize that
the protest of union workers against working with nonunion workers
grows out of their concern that the subcontracting of work to nonunion
firms will erode negotiated union standards. To permit a general contractor to subcontract to nonunion firms is to allow him to evade his
collective bargaining obligations. This concern extends not only to job
sites at which the general contractor brings a nonunion subcontractor
together with his own union workers, but also to job sites at which the
general contractor displaces his union employees by subcontracting all
the work to nonunion firms. 139
In sum, the Connell Court's holding gave a broader scope to the
proviso than its analysis of the proviso's purpose suggested was appropriate. Moreover, the Court, in stating the purpose of the proviso,
failed to accord sufficient weight to Congress's desire to preserve bargaining patterns, and thus overemphasized the problem of job-site friction. Finally, although the Court did not discuss what it meant by jobsite friction, it appeared to endorse the view that such frictions exist
between union and nonunion workers. In fact, however, the source of
the tension is the general contractor who invites the nonunion subcontractor onto the site.
The Connell decision forced the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts to choose between incompatible alternatives. If a collective bargaining relationship protects a subcontracting agreement, as the
holding implies, a union may impose an agreement on employers even
136. 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See notes 29-38 supra and accompanying text.
137. 105 CONG. REc. 16,396 (1959), reprintedin II LFoIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1425. See
note 36 supra.
138. 105 CONG. REc. 16,418 (1959), reprintedin II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 1436.
139. Denver Building Trades involved only a common-situs conflict. See 186 F.2d at 332

(Trades Council employees of the general contractor at other job sites remained on the job), rev'd,
341 U.S. 675 (1951). The court in In re Bullard Contracting Co., 464 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.N.Y.
1979), however, recognized that the job-site conflict might occur precisely when the general contractor subcontracted all job-site work. Id. at 317. See also notes 152-54 infra and accompanying
text.
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though the agreement is not restricted to a particular job site. But if the
proviso shelters only those agreements aimed at common-situs
problems, the restriction to a particular job site is crucial. This uncertainty guaranteed controversy in applying Connell to different factual
settings.
C. The Response of the Board's General Counsel and the Courts to
Connell.
1. The NLRB General Counsel's Comell Memorandum. The
General Counsel's reaction to the Connell decision demonstrated that
the ambiguities of the opinion offered a springboard for a narrow reading of the construction industry proviso. A memo from the General
Counsel, issued in December 1976, fixed policy on when to issue complaints attacking subcontracting clauses under section 8(e) in light of
Connell.t 40 According to the General Counsel, Connell requires the
conclusion that the "proviso reflected a Congressional determination
that a construction union has a legitimate interest in assuring that employees represented by it on a construction site are not required to work
alongside non-union employees on that site"; 141 any subcontracting
agreement broader than necessary to further this interest would not fit
under the proviso.
The memorandum asserted that under Connell a subcontracting
agreement is lawful only if entered into in the context of collective bargaining.142 But to accord with its conception of the proviso's purpose,
the memorandum further required that subcontracting restrictions operate only at particular job sites and only at times when union employ140. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at I, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 295 (1976). The General Counsel's memorandum provides guidance on how regional
offices should handle subcontracting agreements under Connell. The regional offices have the
responsibility to issue complaints upon charges filed by an aggrieved party. d I-II, reprintedin
LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 296 (1976).
141. Id. II, reprintedin LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 296 (1976). Under section 3(d) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976), the General Counsel has a responsibility to authorize the issuance of a
complaint if reasonable cause exists to believe that a given practice violates the Act. In light of the
unpredictable development of the law under section 8(e), the General Counsel found it necessary
to consider post-Connell issues carefully and to resolve doubts by issuing complaints in order to
allow the Board and courts to adjudicate the issues. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum,
supra note 14, at VII, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 300 (1976).
142. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at 4, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 297-98 (1976). The memorandum suggested, however, that a union representing a
subcontractor's employees might lawfully agree with the general contractor to confine job-site
subcontracting to union firms even in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. Id., reprintedin LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 298 (1976). The common-situs relationship would be enough to
place such a clause within the purpose that Connell assigned to the proviso.
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ees would be present. 143 These additional limitations nullify the
language of the Connell holding, which indicated that a collective bargaining relationship alone is enough to bring a subcontracting agreement within the proviso.144
The memorandum also stated that a regional office should issue a
complaint when a subcontracting clause restricts subcontracting to
firms having a bargaining relationship with a specified union rather
than with any union. 145 While noting that Senator Kennedy believed
the construction industry proviso was "necessary to avoid serious damage to the pattern of collective bargaining" in the industry, 46 the General Counsel weighed these remarks against the fact that unionsignatory subcontracting clauses lend themselves to top-down organizing,147 which Connell had condemned. In addition, the General Counsel questioned whether the pattern of collective bargaining in the
construction industry in 1959 included union-signatory clauses. To determine what bargaining patterns existed in 1959, the General Counsel
examined studies of that year's bargaining agreements and initiated his
own study. 148 The evidence gathered by the General Counsel suggested that subcontracting agreements varied widely in 1959. He there143. Id. 20, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 312-13 (1976). These limitations ensure that a
subcontracting agreement will protect against shoulder-to-shoulder job-site friction, but will not
become an instrument for top-down organizing.
The memorandum also determined that a section 8(f) agreement is a sufficient collective bargaining relationship under Connell, with certain limitations. First, the clause must not be operational before employees are hired, because at that point no employees that the union represents
are threatened by the prospect of working on a job site along with nonunion employees. Second,
the operation of the clause must be restricted to times when the represented employees will actually be at work. The General Counsel further contended that subcontracting restrictions on craft
union members performing work outside the jurisdiction of the bargaining unit were permissible,
because union carpenters have the same interest in working alongside union plumbers and electricians as they do in working with union carpenters. Id 8-9, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 305
(1976).
144. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
145. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at V-VI, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 298-99 (1976).
146. Id. 13, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 308 (1976) (quoting 105 CONG. REc. 17,899
(1976), reprinted in II LEGiS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1432).
147. See note 10 supra.
148. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at 13-16, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 308-09 (1976). The General Counsel reviewed Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, 84 MONTHLY LAB. RV. 579-86, 715-23 (1961). The General Counsel's own study
evaluated contracts on file at the Department of Labor, and contracts provided by the AFL-CIO.
NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, .supra note 14, at 14, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK
309 (1976).
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that Congress could not have intended to preserve this
fore concluded
"mosaic."1 49
By concentrating on the purposes Connell attributed to the pro-.
viso, the General Counsel's memorandum read out of the Connell

opinion the "context of a collective bargaining relationship" language
that was central to the Court's holding. Furthermore, the General
Counsel accepted the job-site friction rationale as the only purpose be-

hind the proviso. By jettisoning continuity of bargaining patterns as a
congressional motive, the General Counsel endorsed Connell's narrow

view of the proviso.
2. Court Decisions Interpreting Connell. The district courts con-

sidering Connell's impact divided into two groups. One group emphasized the importance of the presence or absence of a collective

bargaining relationship in deciding whether the proviso protects a subcontracting clause. 150 The other group stressed the avoidance of job-

site conflict as the determining factor.' 5 '
In Orange Belt Council v. Maloney, Inc. ,152 the employer chal-

153
lenged the validity of a union-signatory subcontracting agreement

that was not restricted to particular job sites. In upholding the clause,
the court distinguished Connell on the ground that the union in Connell

did not represent Connell's employees, but the union in the case at bar
did represent Maloney's employees. ' 54 In contrast, OperatingEngineers
149. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at 16, reprintedin LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 309 (1976).
150. See notes 152-54 infra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 155-58 infra and accompanying text.
152. 98 L.R.R.M. 3193 (C.D. Cal. 1978), af'don other grounds, 106 L.R.R.M. 2183 (9th Cir.
1980).
153. See note 10 supra.
154. 98 L.R.R.M. at 3194. The court also stated: "I cannot believe that [the employer] effectively could have nullified the proviso by simply making certain that none of his own employees
were on the same job site as the subcontractor's non-union people." Id. The court thus implied
that to create such a rule would encourage an employer to ignore his collective bargaining agreement with the union and subcontract all work at the job site to nonunion firms.
A similar subcontracting clause in a collective bargaining agreement was upheld against an
antitrust attack in In re Bullard Contracting Corp., 464 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). But see
Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1375 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc) (holding ax1 agreement invalid on antitrust grounds because "here there is
neither a collective bargaining relationship. . . nor any evidence of a common-situs problem").
The Federal Trade Commission has also attacked subcontracting agreements on antitrust
grounds. See In re Teamsters Local 959, 93 F.T.C. 739 (1979) (the Teamsters signed a consent
decree agreeing not to enter into subcontracting agreements that extended beyond particular job
sites); Report on Federal Trade Commission Action against the Alaska Teamsters, 138 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) A-I (July 18, 1978).
For an antitrust counterattack by the construction unions, see California State Council of
Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., No. 77-2323 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 1980) (the
unions' allegation that construction employers had conspired to boycott union subcontracting
firms was held to state a Sherman Act claim).
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v. Neilsen & Co. 155 held a subcontracting agreement unlawful on anti-

56
trust grounds after rejecting a construction-industry proviso defense.1

The court reasoned that the proviso was designed only to eliminate job-

site friction. Because no union employees were present on the site, the
agreement did not serve this purpose and therefore was void.

57

Simi-

larly, in Long v. FloorcraftCarpet Co. ,158 the court refused to enforce a
subcontracting agreement that operated when union employees were
not present at the site with the subcontractor's nonunion employees.
D.

The Board's Post-Connell Decisions.
The Board addressed the post-Connell issues in four cases joined

for argument in 1978.159 These cases required the Board to clarify the
import of the Connell decision for secondary subcontracting agreements. The Board, limiting Connell to its facts, upheld broad subcontracting restrictions within a collective bargaining context and decided
that a prehire agreement under section 8(f) satisfied the collective bargaining requirement.
In Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc.)160 a

subcontractor and a carpenters local, while renegotiating a collective
bargaining agreement, reached an impasse over whether to retain a
union-signatory subcontracting clause in the new contract.16' The
union then picketed four job sites, stopping work at two of them.
155. 92 L.R.R.M. 2861 (D. Idaho 1975).
156. The court found that the agreement violated the Sherman Act and that the construction
industry proviso did not shield it. Id. at 2863-64.
157. Id.
158. 95 L.R.R.M. 3143 (D. Or. 1977).
159. Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc.), 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), enforced as mod#fedsub nort Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc., v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionfor rehearingen banc granted, No. 78-3469
(9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980); Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Utilities Servs. Eng'g, Inc.),
239 N.L.R.B. 253 (1978); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Donald Schriver, Inc.)
(Sullivan-Kelley & Assocs.), 239 N.L.R.B. 264 (1978), enforcedsub nom. Donald Schriver, Inc. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Operating Eng'rs Local 701 (Pacific Northwest Chapter of
the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.), 239 N.L.R.B. 274 (1978), enforced as mod#ed sub
nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionfor rehearingen banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19,
1980).
160. 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), enforcedas modfled sub nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionfor rehearingen banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
161. 239 N.L.R.B. at 241. The contract also contained an alternative subcontracting clause
that purported to meet the requirements of a valid union-standards clause (for a definition of a
union standards clause, see note lOsupra),but the Board found that the terms were so specific that
only an affiliate of the Carpenters could qualify; the alternative clause was therefore equivalent to
a union-signatory subcontracting clause. 239 N.L.R.B. at 247.
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Woelke filed charges under section 8(b)(4)(A). 162
The Board first determined that the subcontracting agreements
had secondary purposes

63

and then held that under Connell the pro-

viso to section 8(e) protects subcontracting agreements in a collective
bargaining context regardless of whether they are limited to particular

job sites.'6 According to the Board, the Connell Court's description of
the proviso's purposes bore only on agreements outside of a collective

bargaining relationship. 65 Connell thus did not require that the Board
disallow a broad subcontracting agreement negotiated within such a
relationship.
In the second case, OperatingEngineers Local 701 (PacificNorthwest Chapterof the AssociatedBuilders and Contractors,Inc.),166 an en-

gineers' local entered into a collective bargaining agreement with an
association of general contractors. The agreement required all subcon-

tractors to be parties to "an existing labor agreement with the
Union."' 67 The agreement also provided that the parties would arbitrate grievances, but that the union could resort to self-help enforce-

ment of the arbitrator's decision.168 A second contractors' association
alleged that the clause violated section 8(e). The Board held that the
162. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976). This section prohibits picketing or threatening to picket
for the purpose of obtaining an agreement that violates section 8(e). Agreements that are lawful
under section 8(e), such as those the proviso protects, are exempt from scrutiny under section
8(b)(4)(A). See Building & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Pressure may thus be used to obtain lawful section 8(e) proviso subcontracting agreements, subject
to certain limits. Construction, Prod. & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422
(9th Cir. 1963). First, if the aim of the desired agreement is to force the termination of business
relations between the employer and a specific second person, the picketing may violate section
8(b)(4)(B) despite its lawfulness under section 8(b)(4)(A). Second, if the union exerting pressure
seeks a subcontracting clause in the context of recognitional picketing-that is, if the union seeks
not only a subcontracting clause, but agredments about wages, hours, pensions, grievance procedures, union security, working conditions, and health and safety benefits--the picketing is regulated by section 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). Section 8(b)(7)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A)
(1976), flatly bans recognitional picketing when the employer has recognized another union; section 8(b)(7)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976), prohibits all recognitional picketing when a valid
election has been held within one year. In all other cases section 8(b)(7)(C) prohibits recognitional
picketing beyond a reasonable time not to exceed thirty days unless the union files an election
petition with the Board.
163. 239 N.L.R.B. at 247.
164. Id. at 250. The union and the contractor had also reached an impasse over the union's
proposal to include foremen in the bargaining unit. The Board found that the union's attempt to
include supervisors in the collective bargaining unit was an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976).
165. 239 N.L.R.B. at 249.
166. 239 N.L.R.B. 274 (1978), enforcedas modfed sub nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionfor rehearingen banc granted,No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
167. 239 N.L.R.B. at 275.
168. Id.
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self-help enforcement clauses rendered the otherwise lawful subcontracting agreement unlawful. 169 Although the construction industry
proviso protects the subcontracting restraint, section 8(b)(4)(B) 170 prohibits its coercive enforcement.
The third of the four decisions, Los Angeles Building and Construcion Trades Council (DonaldSchriver,Inc.),171 involved the facts of two
cases. In DonaldSchriver17 z an owner-builder, Schriver, had signed an
agreement with the Trades Council under section 8(f),' 73 which permits
recognition of minority unions in the construction industry. At no
time, however, had Schriver employed union members. The agreement
contained both a secondary subcontracting clause and a self-help enforcement clause. The Carpenters, an affiliate of the Trades Council,
threatened to picket Schriver to enforce the bargaining agreement, but
no picketing actually occurred. Schriver brought unfair labor practice
charges against the Carpenters, alleging that the agreement violated
section 8(e). In the related case 174 Topaz, a nonunion framing subcontractor, began work on an all-union site. The Carpenters presented Topaz with the union's standard collective bargaining contract, which
contained a union-signatory subcontracting clause with a self-help enforcement provision. Topaz declined to sign a contract that applied
beyond the job site at which he was currently working. The Carpenters
then picketed the job site for ten days. Topaz alleged that the picketing
violated section 8(b)(4)(A) because the subcontracting clause was ilegal under section 8(e).
The Board had decided in Woelke & Romero that the construction
industry proviso sheltered subcontracting clauses like the ones involved
in DonaldSchriver and Topaz (but for their self-help enforcement provisions) if the clauses were contained in a collective bargaining agreement. 75 The consolidated DonaldSchrivercase presented the question
whether a section 8(f) prehire agreement satisfied the collective bargaining requirement. The Board held that it did. 176 Congress had enacted section 8(f) and the proviso to section 8(e) to harmonize federal
labor policy with the economic reality of the construction industry.
The Board therefore decided to "coordinate" section 8(f) with the pro169. Id. at 278.

170. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
171. 239 N.L.R.B. 264 (1978), enforcedsub nom. Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859

(D.C. Cir. 1980).
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

239 N.L.R.B. at 265-66.
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). For the text of section 8(0, see note 105 Supra.
239 N.L.R.B. at 266.
See id. at 245-47.
Id. at 270.
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viso to section 8(e) and to permit a prehire agreement to support a subcontracting restraint. 177 The Board held invalid the self-help
178
enforcement clauses, however.
In the fourth case, Colorado Building and Construction Trades
Council (Utilities Services Engineering,Inc. ), 179 a construction contractor had no collective bargaining agreement with a union. The Trades

Council presented the contractor with a subcontracting proposal, but
did not seek to represent the contractor's employees. 180 Building on the
Woelke & Romero analysis, the Board noted that Connell required either of two conditions before an agreement would be permitted under

the construction industry proviso: a bargaining relationship or a common-situs limitation. 18 1 Here, there was no bargaining relationship between the Trades Council and the contractor, nor was the agreement

designed to avert common-situs tension. The agreement's operation
was not limited to times when union workers would work alongside

nonunion workers. In addition, the clause permitted union and nonunion workers to be present on the same job site, for it did not restrict the

subcontracting of work in trades other than those represented in the
Trades Council. The Board thus found that the agreement violated
182
section 8(e).

In these four decisions the Board seized on the facts and holding of
Connell rather than concentrating on Connell's statement of the pro-

viso's purposes.18 3 Confining Connell's policy analysis to subcontract177. Id. The Board found that section 8(1) and the construction industry proviso were the
product of congressional concern for the unique features of the construction industry, described in
text accompanying notes 126-30 supra. 239 N.L.R.B. at 269.
178. 239 N.L.R.B. at 270. A lawful construction-industry subcontracting agreement cannot be
coercively enforced. See note 101 supra See also Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839 (1965),
enforcedsubnom. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 769,405 F.2d 159 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
179. 239 N.L.R.B. 253 (1978).
180. Id.
181. 239 N.L.R.B. at 255-56.
182. Id. at 254-55. The agreement that the union sought resembled the Connell agreement
itself, and the Board appropriately found it unlawful. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently decided an antitrust case with facts similar to Connell; the court used reasoning similar to
the Board's in Colorado Building Trader. See Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
183. The Board stated in Woelke & .Romero that
the [Connell] Court's entire decision is cast in terms of the impact of the absence of a
collective-bargaining relationship upon the applicability of the proviso. . . . The bottom line of the Court's opinion, as we construe it, is that the construction industry proviso to Section 8(e) permits subcontracting clauses such as those here in the context of a
collective bargaining relationship, and possibly even without such a relationship if the
clauses are aimed at avoiding the Denver Building Trades problem.
239 N.L.R.B. at 250. This assessment of Connell closely resembles the language of Connell's holding. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
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ing clauses agreed on outside a collective bargaining relationship, the
Board viewed a collective bargaining relationship and a common-situs
limitation as alternative tests for the validity of a subcontracting agreement. 184 Moreover, the Woelke & Romero decision did not criticize
Connell's description of the proviso's purpose, or state additional purposes for the proviso. 185 Thus, the Board did nothing to diminish the
force of the argument that the 86implications of Connell compel a narrowing of the proviso's scope.'

m (state 111.7 s.4 N 11.7 0 0 11 56 538.6 Tm (m381state 111.7TH8 1 Tf 9582.3 T 0 olltates )Tj
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considered two Board decisions, Woelke & Romero Framing190 and Operating Engineers Local 701.191 A panel of the court agreed with the
Board that the subcontracting clauses involved in both decisions were
secondary, 92 but held that the proviso did not protect the clauses despite the presence of collective bargaining relationships. 93 The court

ruled that a bargaining relationship is not enough; the employer or a
subcontractor must also at "some time"'194 have union members work-

ing at the job site where the union wishes to restrict subcontracting. In
addition, the restriction may neither extend beyond that site nor include crafts other than that of the signatory union. 195 The196court would,

however, permit union-signatory-subcontracting clauses.

The unions in PacfcNorthwest argued that when Congress passed

section 8(e), union-signatory subcontracting clauses were lawful under
the Supreme Court decision in Local 1976 United Brotherhood of

Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door).

97

Reading the legislative history to

190. 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), enforcedasmodtifedsub nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionfor rehearingen bane granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
191. 239 N.L.R.B. 274 (1978), enforcedas modfled sub nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),pelttionfor rehearingen banc granted,No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
192. 609 F.2d at 1346. The court also agreed with the Board that picketing to include foremen
within the bargaining unit violated section 8(b)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976). 609 F.2d at
1351. See note 164 supra.
193. The PacfcNorthwest court did not consider what standard to use when reviewing the
Board's interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that a court should give the Board's interpretation of the Act substantial deference when it is
"defensible," even if the court would prefer a different approach. See NLRB v. Local 103, Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978). In Local 103 the Court upheld the Board's ruling that picketing to enforce a pre-hire agreement under section 8(f) is recognitional picketing regulated by section 8(b)(7) until the union achieves majority status. But the Court recognized that there were
other tenable interpretations of the Act. Id.
194. 609 F.2d at 1347. The court held that
the construction industry proviso extends shelter only when a collective bargaining relationship exists and even then only when the employer or his subcontractor has employees who are members of the signatory union at work at some time at the job site at which
the employer wishes to engage a non-union subcontractor.
Id.
195. On the restriction to a particular job site, see id. at 1347-48; on the restriction to the
signatory union's crafts, see id. at 1349-50. Although the PacFcNorthwest court did not acknowledge this, the craft restriction would prevent a union from overcoming the common-situs tension
that arose in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
196. 609 F.2d at 1350 n.8. It is not clear, however, whether the court would require a subcontracting clause to be a union-signatory clause. See note 10 supra for a discussion of union-signatory clauses.
197. 357 U.S. 93 (1958). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit phrased the Board's and
the union's argument as a syllogism: "At the time the proviso was enacted, the union signatory
subcontractor provisions were lawful. The proviso intended to preserve in the construction indus-
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indicate that Congress intended to preserve the existing law,198 the unions concluded that such clauses remained lawful. 199 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected both premises of this argument.
Contrary to the unions' position, the Pacjfc Northwest court believed
that SandDoor held only that a hot-cargo agreement was not a defense
to a charge under section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act; that the Sand
Door Court expressly declined to address the validity of hot-cargo
agreements; 200 and that because Sand Door concerned only a product
boycott, it did not resolve the lawfulness of subcontracting agreements
201
under Taft-Hartley.
These observations do not accord with the Supreme Court's interpretation of SandDoor. In National Woodwork ManufacturersAssociation v. NLRB 20 2 the Court declared that section 8(e) was designed to
plug the loophole created when SandDoor ruled that hot-cargo agreements were lawful.20 3 The Court reaffirmed the view that Sand Door
upheld such agreements in NLRB v. Popftters Local 638.204 In that
case the Court stated that "the making and voluntary observance of
[hot-cargo] contracts were not contrary to'law at the time that Sand
Neither of these cases distinguished beDoor was decided ....,o205
tween secondary product-boycott contracts and secondary subcontracting contracts. Thus, later Supreme Court decisions considered Sand
Door to have resolved the legality of secondary agreements.
Pacfic Northwest also rejected the unions' claim that the proviso
intended to preserve the existing state of the law, finding the proviso's
effect on the law of Sand Door "unclear." 206 Although a Conference
208
Report to the House2 7 and statements of Senator John Kennedy
suggest that section 8(e) and the proviso preserve the law of SandDoor,
the Pacjfc Northwest court found these statements unreliable. The
court believed that the Act changed the law of Sand Door: although
try the law as it then existed. Hence, the proviso was intended, and should be construed, to protect

subcontractor provisions." 609 F.2d at 1348.
198. 609 F.2d at 1348-49.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1349.

201. Id. at 1348. A product-boycott agreement obligates an employer not to require his employees to use goods made by nonunion workers. A subcontracting agreement obligates an employer not to subcontract to nonunion firms.
202. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
203. Id. at 634.

204. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
205. Id. at 516.
206. 609 F.2d at 1349.

207. CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 64, at 39, reprintedin I LEGis. HIST., supra note 4, at 934,
943.
208. 105 CONG. REc. 16,415 (1959), reprintedin I LaGIs. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1433.
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SandDoor did not restrict lawful secondary agreements to the job site,
20 9
section 8(e) contains a job-site restriction.
The PacocNorthwest court then independently inquired into the
21
proviso's purpose.2 10 Relying on a pre-Connell Ninth Circuit case, '
212
the court construed the purpose to be "minimizing job site tension.
The agreements at issue in Pacjc Northwest operated even when no
union workers were on the job; the agreements therefore exceeded the
purpose of the proviso. The court added that its holding preserved the
section 7213 rights of workers to engage in or refrain from union activity.214

In order to protect those rights, the court found it necessary to

restrict the top-down organizing potential of subcontracting agree215
ments.
B.

The Districtof Columbia Circuit'sAdoption ofthe Board's View
of the Proviso.

In DonaldSchriver,Inc. v. NLRB,2 1 6 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit enforced the NLRB's decision in Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council (Donald Schriver,
Inc.).2 1 7 The court held that a section 8(f) agreement complies with
Connell's collective bargaining test,218 that a subcontracting agreement
may extend beyond a job site where union members are currently
working, 2 19 and that the agreement may specify a particular union. 220
The DonaldSchriver court distinguished Connell by noting the total absence of a collective bargaining relationship in that case.22 1 Connell held that a collective bargaining relationship is necessary to trigger
the protection of the construction industry proviso; 22 2 it did not, however, specify what type of relationship would suffice. DonaldSchriver
209. 609 F.2d at 1348.
210. Id. at 1349.
211. Acco Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975) (denying protection

under the proviso to a subcontracting clause that covered on-site equipment repairmen).
212. 609 F.2d at 1349.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). For the text of section 7, see note 56 supra.
214. 609 F.2d at 1349.
215. Id. at 1350.
216. 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
217. 239 N.L.R.B. 264 (1978).
218. 635 F.2d at 875.
219. Id. at 881.
220. Id. at 884-85.
221. Id. at 873.
222. 421 U.S. at 633. The Court also left room for a narrow common-situs agreement that
would not have to be negotiated in a collective bargaining context. Id. No court has yet upheld a
subcontracting agreement of this nature.
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declared that a prehire agreement is sufficient. 22 Not only are prehire
agreements the standard form of agreement in the construction industry,2 24 but their presence alters the function of the subcontracting agreement itself. In Connell the subcontracting agreements had a purely
secondary organizational impact; 225 in Donald Schriver "[t]heir pri-

mary goal was not to apply organizational pressure on other firms, but
to standardize the working conditions of the employees of [the signatory] contractors."22 6 Hence, the goal of a subcontracting agreement in
the prehire context is not to organize but to protect the interests of existing union members.
Moreover, the Connell holding reflected a desire to prevent unions
from wielding unlimited power to organize through subcontracting
agreements.22 7 The prehire agreement, as a precondition for protection
under the proviso, meets this need. Section 8(b)(7), 228 which provides a
"comprehensive code" governing recognitional picketing,2 29 is fully ap223. 635 F.2d at 875.
224. Id. at 873. See also NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 348-49 (1977).
225. 421 U.S. at 631.
226. 635 F.2d at 873 (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 871-72. The Connell Court felt compelled to deny protection under the proviso to
the Plumbers' subcontracting agreement in order to avoid opening a "glaring loophole" in Section
8'srestrictions on top-down organizing. 421 U.S. at 616. To understand what the Connell Court
meant by a "glaring loophole," it is necessary to analyze the interaction of several provisions of
section 8.
Section 8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976), regulates recognitional picketing by restricting it to a reasonable time not to exceed thirty days unless a petition for an election under
section 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976), is filed. Section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976),
prohibits unions from picketing to coerce an employer to cease doing business with any other
person. Section 8(b)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976), prohibits unions from picketing to
secure an agreement that is unlawful under section 8(e).
These provisions form a carefully designed web to limit union efforts at top-down organizing.
See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. at 632. The Plumbers sought to organize from the top down, contrary to the policy of section 8. Section 8(b)(7)(C), however, did not
apply to the Plumbers' subcontracting agreement. Because the union disclaimed an interest in
representing Connell's employees, its picketing was not recognitional. Cf. Dallas Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Trades Council picketing for a subcontracting agreement for the crafts that belonged to the Council was held to be subject to section
8(b)(7)). Section 8(b)(4)(B) did not apply; it prohibts picketing aimed at forcing an employer to
cease doing business with a specific person but does not prohibit picketing to secure a general
agreement not to do business with, for example, nonunion firms. If section 8(b)(4)(A), the scope
of which depends on section 8(e), did not apply, the union's conduct would thus be permitted to
slip through the statutory scheme-creating the "glaring loophole" that the Connell Court feared.
The Court therefore faced the question whether section 8(e) should be construed to permit subcontracting agreements absent a collective bargaining relationship. To avoid undermining the
policy against top-down organizing, the Court held that section 8(e) should not be so construed.
421 U.S. at 632-33.
228. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976).
229. See NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 291 (1960).
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plicable to agreements under section

8(f).230

A union seeking a subcon-

tracting agreement as a term of a prehire contract thus cannot exert

unlimited pressure to organize nonunion subcontractors.
Having decided that a section 8(f) contract brought a subcontract-

ing agreement within the scope of Connell, the DonaldSchriver court
then determined the scope of a permissible agreement. At the outset
the court endorsed the view that the proviso enables unions both to

avoid job-site friction and to maintain contract standards. 231 Broad
subcontracting agreements that apply beyond particular job sites protect contract standards and accord with the scope of section 8(f) agreements, which apply at unspecified future job sites. 232 Thus, a valid

subcontracting agreement may apply at job sites that are as yet unforeseen. In addition, it may restrict subcontracting in crafts other than
that of the signatory union's craft because of the job-site friction policy. 233 The court reached this conclusion by looking to the literal language of the proviso, 234 its legislative history,235 the longstanding use of

broad subcontracting agreements, 236 and the compatibility of subcon230. See NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978). Before a union attains
majority status, a section 8(f) agreement does not have binding force on an employer; the union is
therefore subject to section 8(b)(7)'s limitation on recognitional picketing. From the perspective of
enforcement, a minority union with a prehire agreement is in the same position as a union that has
no collective bargaining agreement at all. See NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335
(1978).
231. 635 F.2d at 880.
232. Id. at 881. An employer does not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to comply
with the terms of a section 8(f) agreement at a specific job site, however, until the union demonstrates majority support. See NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 346 (1978). Thus,
a union cannot enforce a subcontracting agreement included in a section 8(f) contract by picketing
or by filing unfair labor practice charges until it obtains majority support at a particular job site.
The contract might be enforceable in court, however, even without majority support. See Contractors Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co., No. 80-1191 (8th Cir. Jan. 21, 1981).
InAssociated Wrecking, the court held that a union may enforce the fringe benefits provisions of a
prehire agreement in a federal court action under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1976), despite the absence of majority support for the union. This holding conflicts with dicta in
Local 103. See 434 U.S. at 351-52.
233. 635 F.2d at 883-84. The court noted that restrictions on subcontracting outside of the
craft that has signed the subcontracting agreement might fall outside the proviso if no members of
a signatory craft are to be employed on a given job site. Id. at 881 n.29.
234. Id. at 877. The court refused to make inroads on the statute's literal language without a
compelling policy. Id.
235. Id. at 878-79.
236. Id. at 879-80. The court stressed the fact that no case before or after the enactment of the
construction industry proviso struck down a subcontracting agreement because it was not limited
to the common-situs situation. Id. at 879. Additionally, a study indicated that such agreements
were prevalent in 1959. Id. See Lunden, SubcontractingClauses in Major Contracts (pts. 1-2), 84
MONTHLY LAB. Rv. 579, 715 (1961).
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tracting agreements with the working conditions in the construction in237
dustry.
Finally, the court affirmed the validity of subcontracting agreements that designate a specific union that a subcontractor must recognize. Interunion strife may disrupt job-site work to the same extent as
union-nonunion strife. The court agreed with the Court of Appeals for
2 38
the Ninth Circuit on this issue.
DonaldSchriver carefully examined the actual patterns of bargaining in the construction industry before upholding the broad subcontracting clauses before it. The court also returned to the legislative
history to support its views. These fresh inquiries brought a new perspective to the construction industry proviso. Because DonaldSchriver
explored the empirical basis for extending proviso protection to broad
subcontracting agreements, it provides a practical reconciliation of the
National Labor Relations Act and the construction industry bargaining
patterns.
C. The Conflict Between Donald Schriver and Connell.
Connell's reading of the proviso did not escape the Donald
Schriver court. The court sought, however, to reduce Connell's statement of the purposes of the proviso to dicta. DonaldSchriver asserted
that the Supreme Court merely speculated about a number of possible
reasons for the proviso but found it unnecessary to select one because
the Plumbers could not connect their conduct to any of the suggested
reasons. 239 Even though Connell did not settle on a single policy, however, its discussion of these policies was necessary to the result of the
case. 24° DonaldSchriver attempts to finesse Connell's doubts concerning the congressional motive of preserving a pattern of bargaining, and
Connell's apparent preference for a common-situs approach to the proviso, 24 1 by stating, "The Supreme Court. . .did not determine the purpose behind the construction industry proviso. '242 This strategy cannot
conceal the conflict between DonaldSchriver's elaborate examination
of subcontracting practices in the construction industry and Connell's
explanation of the proviso as a narrow measure to reverse DenverBuild237. 635 F.2d at 880-81. The court emphasized that continuity of fringe benefits from job site
to job site would be extremely difficult to secure without subcontracting agreements. The court
also reasoned that the construction worker is generally indifferent whether he works for the general contractor or the subcontractor as long as he works under union conditions. Id.
238. Id. at 884-85.
239. Id. at 871-72.
240. Without establishing a range of policies behind the proviso, the Court could not have
found that the Plumbers' agreement fell outside the proviso.
241. See notes 96-100 supra and accompanying text.
242. 635 F.2d at 877 n.25.
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ing Trades. 43 Although Connell may not have given enough weight to
certain portions of the legislative history, the interpretation that Con-

nell has given to the proviso may not be removed so easily.
More fundamentally, the holding of Donald Schriver clashes with
the implications of Connell for top-down organizing. Though the Donald Schriver court noted the emphasis that Connell placed on the policy
against top-down organizing, it held that the policy did not apply to a
subcontracting clause in a prehire agreement. 244 The court stated that
such an agreement would be lawful, even if it had the sweeping organi-

zational effect of the Connell agreement, because its purpose is simply
to protect the union members' opportunities to work under union con245
ditions.

Connell, however, seems to leave little room for any top-down organizational impact in its analysis of the proviso's purpose. The Court
not only implied that the proviso was designed primarily to permit the
avoidance of work stoppages due to Denver Building Trades problems,

but also emphasized that section 8(f) was the only consideration given
to construction unions seeking to widen their base. 246 The Connell

Court may have attached exaggerated importance to the policy against
247
top-down organizing in limiting the construction industry proviso.
Nevertheless, Connell might imply a denial of proviso protection to a

subcontracting agreement with a vast, if unintended, potential to or2 48
ganize from the top down.
243. See generally NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See
notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
244. 635 F.2d at 873-74. The contractors suggested at oral argument that section 8(b)(7) fails
to stem top-down organizing in the construction industry, arguing that "it is not an effective remedy because it isn't just picketing for 30 days. . . . [T]he way the Board has interpreted 8(b)(7)
...
Id. at 876 n.24. For the Board's interpretation of
the union can picket for 75 and 100 days.
section 8(b)(7) see Hod Carriers Local 840 (Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962). See
also NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978) (picketing to enforce a section 8(f)
prehire agreement before the union has attained majority support is regulated by section 8(b)(7)).
The DonaldSchriver court pointed out that the contractors' criticism attacks the remedy provided
by Congress. 635 F.2d at 876 n.24. Nevertheless, the efficacy of this remedy might well be considered in deciding whether to tolerate the top-down organizing impact of subcontracting agreements
even within a prehire agreement.
245. 635 F.2d at 873.
246. 421 U.S. at 629-33. See notes 98-106 supra and accompanying text.
247. See notes 111-39 supra and accompanying text.
248. It is also not clear that the organizational impact of subcontracting clauses is unintended.
See OFFICE OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY SERVICES, LABOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES ADMINIS-

TRATION, U.S. DEI"T OF LABOR, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OFFICE OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
SERVICES 4. The report states in part: "In March 1978, the Building and Construction Trades
Department established a formal organizing program in the Los Angeles area. . . .The program
is very broad and involves both top-down and bottom-up organizing .... The organizing operation netted over 10,000 new members for the building trades unions in 1978." Id.
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CONCLUSION

In Donald Schriver the construction industry proviso has finally
been given a proper analysis. That case has supplied the economic
framework that is essential to grasp the purposes of the proviso. Prior
to Donald Schriver, courts had been narrowing the proviso to fit the
purpose of avoiding job-site friction. Donald Schriver demonstrates,
however, that Congress had broader concerns when it partially freed
construction unions from the net of anti-secondary provisions of the
labor laws. To protect work opportunities and to standardize working
conditions, unions must have the power to compel general contractors
to adhere to negotiated terms, even if the general contractors choose to
employ their construction workers through the medium of a subcontractor.
The paradox of this conclusion is that it conflicts with other wellestablished labor policies. Union work opportunities can be ensured
through subcontracting agreements only by forcing nonunion subcontractors to recognize a union in order to secure work on a job site.
Whether the National Labor Relations Act permits this effect is a question of statutory interpretation; whether it ought to sanction it is a judgment that belongs to Congress. In the absence of a clear congressional
statement to the contrary, the balance struck in DonaldSchriver is fair,
permitting construction unions to maintain the working standards of
their members while limiting their power to exert pressure on nonunion
firms. To the extent that this balance conflicts with the implications of
the Supreme Court's decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers
Local 100, the Supreme Court should resolve the inconsistency by endorsing the position of the DonaldSchriver court.
Michael R. Dreeben

